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I. Introduction
The paper examines the evolution of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)’s approach to managing economic crises by comparing its crisis lending 
programs in Asia (1997) and Europe (2008). The purposes for which the IMF 
was established include: “to give confidence to members by making the general 
resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, 
thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their 
balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or 
international prosperity” (Article I (v) of the IMF Articles of Agreement; italics 
added). It is the expression “adequate safeguards” that is the focus of the paper. 
In principle, the IMF provides temporary financing to a country in crisis with a 
reasonable assurance that the policies the country adopts are sufficient to solve 
the underlying balance of payments problem and thus allow the country to repay 
the Fund. 
In its role as a conditional lender, the IMF has provided financial support 
to a large number of countries experiencing balance of payments difficulties 
over many years. The IMF’s conditionality lending, the modality of which 
was perfected from the 1970s through the 1980s, was designed to manage a 
conventional crisis that typically arose from a chronic deficit in the current 
account of the balance of payments. For this reason, a program of adjustment 
policies supported by IMF financing typically called for tight fiscal and 
monetary policies in order to curtail domestic demand. Over time, moreover, 
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conditionality began to include a wide range of structural (meaning non-
macroeconomic) measures to strengthen international competitiveness and 
thereby to promote exports over the medium term. 
In the 1990s, however, the nature of emerging market crises changed, with 
a substantial rise in the volume of cross-border capital flows. In a world where 
capital can move freely, a change in investor sentiment or expectations could 
trigger a large, rapid outflow of capital from a country. There is no guarantee 
that, in a crisis of this nature (often referred to as a capital account crisis), the 
IMF’s conventional approach to crisis management will work as intended. The 
IMF was tested in 1997 when countries in Asia were hit by a capital account 
crisis, and the IMF responded with what some thought was a conventional tool 
kit intended for a current account crisis. The IMF is now being tested again as 
country after country being hit by the ongoing global financial crisis is calling 
for financial assistance from the IMF.
What lessons did the IMF learn from Asia? And what changes has it since 
introduced to the way it manages economic crises today? In order to answer 
these questions, we will compare two sets of IMF programs of crisis lending: 
Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand in 1997 and Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, and 
Ukraine in 2008. In both sets of cases, the IMF provided exceptional financing 
(Table 1). We will examine the content of program conditionality in the IMF’s 
2008 programs to see whether and how it differed from the conditionality it had 
applied in Asia in 1997. We then attempt to identify what the IMF learned from 
Asia and how it applied the lessons to its crisis management strategy in Europe.
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Table 1. IMF Financing in Asia (1997) and Europe (2008)
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses 
why the IMF was criticized for its conditionality in Asia by identifying the 
controversial elements of the Asian programs. Section 3 examines the content of 
macroeconomic conditionality in Europe, arguing that it differed little from the 
conditionality in Asia. Section 4 considers the content of structural conditionality 
in Europe, highlighting in particular the evolution of the IMF’s thinking on the 
topic over the past decade. The next four sections in turn explain how the IMF 
applied the lessons of Asia to Europe by identifying four key features of the 
IMF’s new approach to crisis management: (i) more emphasis on ownership 
(Section 5); (ii) greater collaboration among stakeholders (Section 6); (iii) 
greater transparency and realism (Section 7); and (iv) more flexibility of policy 
options and program targets (Section 8). Finally, Section 9 presents concluding 
remarks.
2. The IMF And The Asian Crisis
The IMF was severely criticized during the Asian crisis of 1997 for 
attaching what some thought was misguided conditionality to its crisis lending 
programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. In terms of program conditionality, 
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there were two controversial aspects to the IMF’s crisis management approach 
in Asia (see, for example, IEO, 2003; also Boorman et al., 2000). 
First, one controversial aspect of the IMF programs in Asia was the tight 
macroeconomic policies that consisted of monetary and fiscal tightening 
through higher interest rates and government expenditure cuts. Critics argued 
that the high interest rate policy damaged the already weak banking sector, 
thereby worsening and unnecessarily prolonging the impact of the crisis. As to 
the tight fiscal policy, all three programs envisaged small fiscal surpluses over 
the program period despite the sharp contraction of economic activity. There 
is now broad agreement that fiscal tightening as initially programmed in Asia 
was unwarranted not only in view of a prospective deceleration of output, but 
also because fiscal balances were initially in surplus and fiscal prodigality was 
never a cause of the crisis (Ito, 2007). The actual outcome, however, was more 
expansionary than programmed because the IMF quickly relaxed the targets and 
automatic stabilizers came into motion.
Second, the IMF programs in Asia required structural reforms in a wide 
range of areas, including some which were considered by many to be unrelated 
to the immediate problem of crisis resolution. Critics argued that some of 
these structural conditionality measures distracted attention from the core 
macroeconomic and financial issues requiring immediate attention; they were 
an encroachment into domestic decision making and created an unnecessary 
political opposition; and they damaged investor confidence by signaling to the 
markets that the situation was worse than they had feared (Furman and Stiglitz, 
1998; Radelet and Sachs, 1998).
Particularly in Indonesia and Korea, structural conditionality went far 
beyond addressing the critical problems of the distressed financial sector. The 
Indonesian program included a large number of additional structural reforms 
related to cronyism and corruption (though not all of them were formally tied 
to the approval and continuation of IMF financing —benchmarks rather than 
performance criteria). In Korea, too, the agenda of reform was broader than 
financial sector restructuring, covering also trade liberalization (especially, the 
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termination of the so-called import diversification program), capital account 
liberalization (allowing greater foreign ownership of Korean firms), corporate 
governance, and labor market reform. Some thought that the IMF had included 
these measures in the crisis lending programs under pressure from its major 
shareholders, especially the United States.
3. Macroeconomic Conditionality
As it was the case in Asia over 10 years ago, the European programs of 
2008 all incorporated tight monetary and fiscal policies. In terms of monetary 
policy, interest rates were raised or credit was tightened in all four countries 
that received IMF financial assistance. For example, Iceland raised the policy 
interest rate by 6 percentage points (to 18 percent) as a prior action for the 
program’s Executive Board approval; the program also set performance criteria 
on the provision of central bank credit to the government and the private sector. 
In Ukraine, although the stance of monetary policy had been tight prior to the 
crisis, the authorities in the fall of 2008 responded to the global tightening of 
liquidity by lowering the policy interest rate by 3.5 percent. The IMF program 
required that monetary policy be reversed back to the tightening stance of the 
pre-crisis period.
As to fiscal policy, all program documents stressed fiscal tightening as 
the critical element of the program. In Hungary, for example, the documents 
explicitly stated that the objective was to implement “a substantial fiscal 
adjustment” and programmed a tightening that amounted to about 1 percent 
(2.5 percent in cyclically adjusted terms) of GDP from 2008 to 2009. The tax 
cut planned for 2009 was also scrapped. The government of Hungary had failed 
several times to raise funds in the market. A government that cannot borrow 
in the market cannot be expected to continue to run fiscal deficits. Surely, 
restoration of fiscal sustainability must be a primary objective of any crisis 
management program.
In Ukraine also, the program envisioned a fiscal tightening amounting 
to 1 percent of GDP. Ukraine had continued to run fiscal deficits amid strong 
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capital inflows, and the need to tighten fiscal policy had been recognized as a 
priority task even before the onset of the crisis. In Latvia, fiscal tightening was 
essential, not only to maintain the fixed exchange rate under the currency board 
arrangement by depreciating the real exchange rate,(1) but also to achieve the 
national goal of joining the Euro Zone.(2) The program documents stated that, 
with determined efforts, the Maastricht criteria for fiscal policy convergence 
could be met by 2012. Under the IMF program, an adjustment equivalent to 7 
percent of GDP was carried out for the 2009 budget (compared to the original 
budget).
4. Structural Conditionality
If there was a difference in the content of program conditionality between 
the Asian and European programs, it was in the area of structural conditionality. 
Whereas structural conditionality in Asia covered reforms in a wide range of 
areas, it was essentially limited to reforms in the banking sector and the fiscal 
system in Europe. In all countries, bank restructuring was closely connected with 
the eventual resolution of the crisis. In Iceland, three major banks holding about 
85 percent of total deposits had failed and were nationalized. In Hungary, where 
more than a half of the outstanding housing loans were denominated in foreign 
currencies, international investors decided to pull out of the country’s banking 
sector when they saw the large balance sheet mismatch. In Latvia, the drying 
up of liquidity associated with the global financial crisis caused the currency 
peg to be challenged and led to a precipitous run on the banking system. Except 
for Ukraine, moreover, conditionality included the introduction of a rule-based 
fiscal framework to ensure medium-term fiscal sustainability. 
Since January 2005, the Latvian lat (LVL) has been pegged to the euro at the central rate of 
0.702804 LVL per euro (with a margin of one percent on either side) under a currency board 
arrangement (where the base money is backed by gold and foreign currency reserves).
An EU member country wishing to adopt the euro is in principle required to meet the 
convergence criteria agreed under the Maastricht Treaty, including the requirements that the 
annual fiscal deficit not exceed 3 percent of GDP and that the balance of gross government 
debt not exceed 60 percent of GDP.
(1)
(2)
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Structural conditionality was more extensive in Latvia, in view of its 
decision to maintain the currency board without devaluing the central rate 
against the euro. In addition to banking sector and fiscal system reforms, 
structural benchmarks were placed on the development of a comprehensive 
debt restructuring strategy, an amendment of the Insolvency Law, and the 
establishment of a framework of wage restraint in the form of a committee in 
the National Tri-Partite Council. The framework of wage restraint is designed to 
depreciate the real exchange rate when the nominal rate is fixed and thereby to 
restore international competitiveness. Although not part of formal conditionality, 
Latvia’s letter of intent also included measures to “promote the development 
of new products and technologies, increase labor market flexibility,” and to 
strengthen “the business environment.”
The more simplified conditionality of the 2008 European programs 
reflected the consensus that had emerged within the IMF during the course of 
post-Asian crisis debate on the need to “streamline” structural conditionality 
in a limited number of “macro-critical” areas. The IMF’s 2002 conditionality 
guidelines and associated documents stated: “conditions that are not of critical 
importance for achieving the macroeconomic goals of the program…are to be 
avoided” (IMF, 2002). The IMF’s internal review of conditionality, comparing 
structural conditionality in IMF programs between 1995-97 and 2001-03, noted 
that major shifts had occurred in the direction of “greater focus on criticality” 
(IMF, 2005).
5. More Emphasis On Ownership
Latest criticisms of recent IMF programs have focused on the essentially 
unchanged nature of macroeconomic conditionality. For example, the Bretton 
Woods Project, a civil society organization that critically monitors IMF and 
World Bank operations, stated in April 2009: “The old recipes of tight fiscal 
policies…and single-digit inflation seem to be at the top of the Fund’s conditions 
and advice to countries that it has bailed out” (BWP, 2009). These criticisms, 
however, miss the real changes that had taken place since the Asian crisis in the 
122 123
Managing Economic Crises
IMF’s conditional policies and procedures. In this and subsequent three sections, 
we identify the features of recent IMF programs that reflect these changes under 
four headings. 
One feature of the IMF’s new approach to crisis management concerns 
the emphasis it places on “ownership,” which the IMF defines as “a willing 
assumption of responsibility for an agreed program of policies” by responsible 
officials in a borrowing country (IMF, 2001, p. 6). Ownership is not a new 
concept. At least in principle, all past IMF programs have been the “IMF-
supported programs” of government-owned policies. But the Asian crisis led to 
a serious reflection on ownership as an essential element of any successful IMF 
intervention in member countries, but particularly during a capital account crisis. 
It became clear that to demand a policy measure to which a government (and 
the society it represents) did not fully commit itself, no matter how desirable the 
policy might be to the national economy, could increase the chance of program 
failure and end up undermining market confidence.
Accordingly the European program documents emphasized, far more than 
the Asian program documents had done, that the choice of any policy measure 
was the authorities’ and that the IMF was simply supporting that choice. For 
example, the Hungarian government had already raised the policy interest rate 
in early 2008, and the IMF program simply maintained the stance of policy 
already chosen. In Iceland, the government had been raising the policy interest 
rate (before the reversal in mid-October) and pledged to reform the Housing 
Financing Fund (as a way of containing the provision of credit). Here again, the 
IMF program simply held on to the previously chosen course of policy. Latvia’s 
choice to keep the exchange rate peg unaltered represented an ultimate form of 
country ownership. Here, the program documents emphasized that, with that 
choice, the rest was the government’s responsibility: the authorities accepted the 
need for “exceptionally strong domestic policies” and understood the “possibility 
that recession could be protracted.”
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6. Greater Collaboration Among Stakeholders
Another feature of the IMF’s new approach is its collaborative relationship 
with other stakeholders. Except for Ukraine, the European program documents 
stated that several stakeholders, such as the European Union (EU), the European 
Central Bank (ECB), the World Bank, and Nordic countries, had participated 
in the preparation of the programs. In Asia, in contrast, the programs were 
negotiated almost exclusively by the IMF staff and the authorities of the 
countries concerned, with limited direct participation by other stakeholders. 
Even the participation of the World Bank in the program negotiations was 
limited.(3)
The resources of the IMF can never be fully adequate in a capital account 
crisis. If investor confidence is totally lost, for example, not only foreign 
investors but also domestic residents could in principle take money out of the 
country by liquidating assets and converting the proceeds into foreign currencies. 
In this regard, the objective of IMF financing is to induce international investors 
to stay in the country (or better still to bring additional money into the country) 
by presenting a program of adjustment policies worthy of their confidence. This 
requires not just volume, but the credibility of the overall financing package. 
This is where IMF programs can be strengthened by collaboration with other 
stakeholders.
The need to collaborate with other multilateral institutions has been 
well recognized by the IMF since the Asian crisis. The 2002 conditionality 
guidelines clearly state that the IMF’s “program design….and conditionality 
will, insofar as possible, be consistent and integrated with those of other 
international institutions within a coherent country-led framework” (IMF, 
2002). Strengthening the IMF-World Bank collaboration in particular has 
been a constant theme (see, for example, IMF, 2004). In Europe, the IMF’s 
new collaborative approach went even further, as it allowed anybody who was 
(3) There was, however, a suspicion that the IMF had incorporated the views of the United 
States in a non-transparent way (even though the country did not offer a penny in the case of 
Thailand).
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willing to provide financing to participate in the preparation of the programs, 
including regional bodies and bilateral donors.
7. Greater Transparency And Realism
A third feature of the IMF’s new approach involves greater transparency 
and realism in the design of programs. For one thing, purpose and logic 
were fully explained in the documents for the European programs. In terms 
of high interest rate policy, for example, the documents in most cases stated 
that the purpose was to stabilize the exchange rate while noting the negative 
consequence of premature monetary easing for this purpose. At the same 
time, the documents also stated the need for banking sector restructuring as an 
objective of the program and, insofar as high interest rate policy conflicted with 
this objective, the need to manage monetary policy flexibly. In Ukraine, the 
documents were explicit in stating the need for further monetary tightening but 
only after the pressing liquidity problem of the banking sector was resolved.
Not disclosing information can give surprise to the market and may end up 
undermining the program. This is a lesson of the Asian crisis. Thus, compared 
to the Asian programs, a far greater amount of information was disclosed to the 
public about the European programs, from the initial stage of the negotiations 
to the announcement of the approved programs. Transparency has increased in 
many public institutions throughout the world over the past decade, with the 
IMF being no exception. In the context of IMF programs, transparency has also 
been considered to be a vehicle of enhancing ownership through deepening the 
“base of support for sound policies among a country’s domestic interest groups” 
(Drazen and Isard, 2004).
As a reflection of greater transparency, the European programs were also 
more realistic in their assumptions and forthright about risks. Particularly 
noteworthy were the forecasts for economic growth, which were all negative for 
2009 (Table 2). In comparison, the growth assumptions in the Asian programs 
were overly optimistic, with all forecasting a positive growth of 2.5-3.5 percent 
for 1996. One of the most significant academic lessons of the Asian crisis is that 
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a large output collapse is likely in an emerging market economy when there is a 
sharp capital outflow reversal accompanied by substantial currency depreciation 
(see Takagi, 2008). The European programs correctly recognized the inevitable.
Table 2. Real GDP Growth under IMF programs (In percent per annum) 1
In terms of fiscal policy, the European programs were also realistic about 
what is feasible and what is not. Although all programs stressed fiscal tightening 
and placed performance criteria on fiscal deficits, they nonetheless allowed the 
deficits to continue (or even increase) in 2009 except in Ukraine (Table 3). The 
logic of fiscal conditionality in the European programs is that it realistically 
allows deficits to remain or increase in the short run while upholding fiscal 
consolidation as the central objective. The documents for Iceland explicitly 
stated that medium-term fiscal consolidation would formally commence in 2010. 
As a consequence of realism, moreover, the programs incorporated flexibility. 
The document for Ukraine, for example, acknowledged the possibility of 
relaxing the fiscal target for 2009 depending on the prevailing circumstances.(4)
(4) The program documents all referred to the need to protect the poor through a social safety net 
measure. The consideration of the social impact of a program was a response to the criticisms 
voiced at the time of the Asian crisis and such need has routinely been noted in all recent IMF 
program documents.
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Table 3. Fiscal Balances under IMF Programs
(In percent of GDP) 1
Risks were highlighted more clearly. For example, the program documents 
indicated that recession was inevitable in Latvia; and 2009 would be a tough 
year for Ukraine, with the likelihood of a prolonged recession. Behind this 
approach is the philosophy that, when there is bad information, it is better to 
disclose it at the outset than to hide and let the market discover the information 
at a later time. In the end, it is not unfounded optimism but honesty that pays 
off in terms of enhancing the probability of success. Although the public will 
never know if all unfavorable information was disclosed, downside risks were 
sufficiently spelled out in the program documents to dispel any impression that 
the IMF was trying to appear overly optimistic to sell the program.
8. More Flexibility Of Policy Options And Program Targets 
Finally, the European programs were more flexible in allowing the countries 
to use “unorthodox” policy measures as well as in the setting of program targets. 
As to policy options, Iceland and Ukraine were allowed to retain the restrictions 
they had introduced prior to approaching the IMF on capital outflows and 
payments for some current transactions; Latvia also retained the exchange 
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control related to the frozen bank deposits. For those who are familiar with the 
IMF’s long-held position on these measures, what it allowed these countries is a 
historic departure and represents its increased flexibility.
Exchange restrictions related to current transactions (except those approved 
under the transitional arrangements of Article XIV) are in violation of Article 
VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement, and are normally not permitted in IMF 
programs as “measures destructive of national or international prosperity” 
(IMF, 2002, p. 2). Capital controls, on the other hand, do not violate the IMF 
Articles as long as they do not restrict payments for current transactions, but the 
IMF has generally taken a position unfavorable to any administrative measure 
that interferes with the free movement of capital.(5) Now the IMF permitted 
exchange restrictions in Europe on the condition that they would be removed as 
soon as practical, and appears to consider capital controls as a legitimate crisis 
management tool.(6)
Greater flexibility applied to the setting of program targets as well. As 
economic conditions that influence investor behavior change frequently, an 
inflexible program may eventually become self-defeating. For this reason, the 
program documents for Ukraine, while targeting a balanced budget for 2009, 
stated that the target could be adjusted flexibly in view of prevailing conditions. 
The biggest uncertainty in all of the programs was the cost of banking sector 
restructuring. Thus, the cost of bank restructuring (including depositor 
protection) was excluded from fiscal conditionality in all four countries. This 
would allow the countries to increase fiscal spending flexibly without violating 
the terms of conditionality. In contrast, the cost of bank restructuring became a 
controversial element of fiscal conditionality in Asia.
(5)
(6)
In 1998, many observers thought that the IMF was hostile to the introduction of a capital 
outflow control by Malaysia. See IEO (2005) for a general review of the IMF’s approach to 
capital account liberalization and related issues.
On the other hand, as EU member countries, Hungary and Latvia did not have the option to 
introduce capital controls.
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9. Conclusion 
The paper has examined the IMF’s recent crisis management programs 
in Europe to see how it applied the lessons of Asia over 10 years ago. We 
have observed that, compared to the Asian programs of 1997, the structural 
conditionality of the European programs of 2008 was more focused on the 
critical areas of financial sector restructuring and fiscal system reforms. The 
overall thrust of macroeconomic conditionality, however, was much the same: 
fiscal and monetary tightening. As noted in the text, a civil society organization 
has recently criticized the IMF for continuing to uphold the “old recipes of tight 
fiscal policies ... and single-digit inflation.”
The paper has argued that the difference between the Asian and European 
programs was subtle, as it was more about approach than about content. In 
particular, we have argued that relative to the Asian programs, the European 
programs were characterized by (i) more emphasis on ownership; (ii) greater 
coordination among stakeholders; (iii) greater transparency and realism; and (iv) 
more flexibility of policy options and program targets. This new approach to 
crisis management reflects the quiet changes incorporated over the past decade 
in the IMF’s conditionality policies and associated procedures, namely, the 
lessons of Asia.
The new approach recognizes that the success of crisis management 
programs, far more than conventional adjustment programs, requires the 
restoration of investor confidence. Attempts were thus made to enhance 
credibility and prevent surprise to the market, including by being realistic 
about assumptions, forthright about risks, and flexible about policy options 
and program targets. Country ownership of policy measures was emphasized 
to affirm national authorities’ commitment; collaboration among various 
stakeholders, with the IMF serving as coordinator, enhanced the credibility of 
the official financing package. When policy measures were of the type that could 
cause controversy, the purpose and logic were fully explained.
It is still premature to make a firm judgment on the effectiveness of the 
IMF’s new crisis management strategy. If exchange rate stability in any way 
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reflects the restoration of investor confidence, the European programs of 2008 
may be said to have achieved some measure of initial success. Capital and 
exchange controls might have also contributed to this outcome in some cases, 
but it is well to remember that such measures are now part of the IMF’s strategy 
that is both realistic and flexible. Only time can tell if the lessons learned in Asia 
and applied in Europe were indeed equal to the task.
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<Summary>
Shinji Takagi
The paper examines the evolution of the IMF’s approach to managing 
economic crises by comparing its crisis lending programs in Asia (1997) and 
Europe (2008). Although the Asian and European programs differed little 
in the content of macroeconomic conditionality, the 2008 programs were 
more streamlined in structural conditionality, with a focus on financial sector 
restructuring and fiscal system reforms. The two sets of programs also differed 
in the way they were designed, explained, and presented. In particular, relative 
to the Asian programs, the European programs were characterized by (i) more 
emphasis on ownership; (ii) greater collaboration among stakeholders; (iii) 
greater transparency and realism; and (iv) more flexibility of policy options 
and program targets. The new approach incorporates the changes made since 
the Asian crisis in the IMF’s conditionality policies and associated procedures, 
namely, the lessons from its experience with the Asian crisis.

